IB Global Politics Legitimacy Questionbank

Source A

Adapted from public records on self-determination referendums, 2011 to 2021.

• South Sudan (January 2011): about 99 percent voted to secede from Sudan; internationally recognised independence followed in July 2011.

• Scotland (September 2014): 55 percent voted to remain in the United Kingdom in a referendum agreed with London.

• Catalonia (October 2017): an independence vote held against the ruling of Spain's courts; the result was not recognised and direct rule was imposed.

• Bougainville (November to December 2019): about 98 percent voted for independence from Papua New Guinea in a non-binding referendum requiring parliamentary ratification.

• New Caledonia (2018, 2020, 2021): three referendums rejected independence from France; the third was boycotted by many pro-independence voters, who disputed its legitimacy.

Source A

Text extract (adapted): "The lines that divide most African states were drawn in European capitals in the 1880s, by men who had never seen the land or its peoples. They split nations in two and forced rivals into a single flag. A border imposed by empire, without the consent of those it enclosed, carries no moral authority. Peoples who never agreed to be governed together, or apart, cannot be bound forever by a colonial mapmaker's pen."

Source B

Text extract (adapted): "Imperfect borders are better than endless war. When African states won independence, their leaders chose to keep the colonial boundaries precisely because reopening every line would have unleashed countless claims and counter-claims. Accepting inherited borders, whatever their origin, gave new states a stable and recognised framework within which to build. Legitimacy, on this view, comes not from how a border was first drawn but from its acceptance by states and the international community as the settled basis of order."

Source A

Source A

Adapted from "Recognition and the Right to Rule," World Order Studies, 2022.

For a state, international recognition can be decisive. Recognition by other governments and admission to bodies such as the United Nations allow a state to sign treaties, borrow from international lenders, trade freely and defend its interests abroad. Contested entities that lack broad recognition, such as Somaliland, Kosovo or Taiwan, may govern effectively and enjoy strong domestic support yet remain excluded from full membership of the international community. Some scholars therefore argue that external recognition is the ultimate test of statehood. Others counter that recognition follows power and interest: states recognise those they wish to, and a government with deep domestic legitimacy and effective control can endure for decades despite limited recognition.

Source B

Adapted from "Consent of the Governed," Journal of Democratic Theory, 2021.

The oldest argument about legitimacy locates it not abroad but at home. On this view, a government is legitimate when those it governs consent to its rule, expressed through free elections, the rule of law and respect for rights. External recognition, however useful, cannot manufacture this domestic acceptance: foreign governments recognised many authoritarian rulers who were despised by their own populations. The Arab uprisings of 2011 showed how quickly internationally recognised leaders can fall once domestic consent evaporates. Legitimacy that is not grounded in the acceptance of the governed, the argument runs, is brittle whatever its standing abroad.

Source A

Source B

Adapted from "Where Authority Comes From: The Foundations of Political Legitimacy," International Governance Review, 2021.

Legitimacy is the widely held belief that an authority has the right to rule and that its commands ought to be obeyed. It is distinct from raw power: a regime may control territory through force yet still be seen as illegitimate by those it governs. Scholars identify several overlapping sources. Some rulers draw on tradition and long-established custom; others on a charismatic leader who inspires personal loyalty. In most modern states, legitimacy rests on legal-rational foundations: leaders gain office through constitutional rules and competitive elections, and citizens accept their authority because the process is seen as fair. A further source is performance, or "output" legitimacy: governments that deliver security, prosperity and public services can earn acceptance even where democratic procedures are weak. Because these sources overlap, the erosion of one need not be fatal, but a regime that loses several at once faces a crisis of authority.

Source C

Adapted from "Recognition Denied: The Taliban and Myanmar's Generals," Journal of Contemporary Statehood, 2023.

Two regimes that seized power by force have struggled to convert control into acceptance. When the Taliban recaptured Kabul in August 2021, they controlled almost all of Afghanistan's territory, yet by 2023 no state had granted them full diplomatic recognition; their seat at the United Nations remained held by representatives of the ousted government. Their exclusion of women from secondary education and public life became a central obstacle to international acceptance. Myanmar's military, which overturned the 2020 election result and detained the elected leadership in February 2021, faced mass civil disobedience, armed resistance and near-total loss of domestic legitimacy. In both cases, effective control of the state did not produce the recognition, at home or abroad, that the rulers sought. Authority imposed by force, these examples suggest, is not the same as authority that is accepted.